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Abstract: We address the sequential change-point detection problem for the Gaussian model where baseline distri-
bution is Gaussian with variance σ2 and mean µ such that σ2 = aµ, where a > 0 is a known constant; the change
is in µ from one known value to another. First, we carry out a comparative performance analysis of four detection
procedures: the CUSUM procedure, the Shiryaev–Roberts (SR) procedure, and two its modifications – the Shiryaev–
Roberts–Pollak and Shiryaev–Roberts–r procedures. The performance is benchmarked via Pollak’s maximal average
delay to detection and Shiryaev’s stationary average delay to detection, each subject to a fixed average run length
to false alarm. The analysis shows that in practically interesting cases the accuracy of asymptotic approximations is
“reasonable” to “excellent”. We also consider an application of change-point detection to cybersecurity – for rapid
anomaly detection in computer networks. Using real network data we show that statistically traffic’s intensity can be
well-described by the proposed Gaussian model with σ2 = aµ instead of the traditional Poisson model, which requires
σ2 = µ. By successively devising the SR and CUSUM procedures to “catch” a low-contrast network anomaly (caused
by an ICMP reflector attack), we then show that the SR rule is quicker. We conclude that the SR procedure is a better
cyber “watch dog” than the popular CUSUM procedure.
Keywords: Anomaly detection; Cybersecurity; CUSUM procedure; Intrusion detection; Sequential analysis; Sequen-
tial change-point detection; Shiryaev–Roberts procedure; Shiryaev–Roberts–Pollak procedure; Shiryaev–Roberts–r
procedure.
Subject Classifications: 62L10; 62L15; 62P30.
1. INTRODUCTION
Sequential change-point detection is concerned with the design and analysis of techniques for fastest (on-
line) detection of a change in the state of a process, subject to a tolerable limit on the risk of committing a
false detection. The basic iid version of the problem considers a series of independent random observations,
X1,X2, . . ., which initially follow a common, known pdf f(x), but subsequent to some unknown time index
ν all adhere to a common pdf g(x) 6≡ f(x), also known; the unknown time index, ν, is referred to as the
change-point, or the point of “disorder”. The objective is to decide after each new observation whether the
observations’ common pdf is currently f(x), and either continue taking more data, if the decision is positive,
or stop and trigger an “alarm”, if the decision is negative. At each stage, the decision is made based solely on
the data observed up to that point. The problem is that the change is to be detected with as few observations
Address correspondence to A. G. Tartakovsky, Department of Mathematics, University of Southern Cali-
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as possible past the true change-point, which must be balanced against the risk of sounding a “false alarm” –
stopping prematurely as a result of an erroneously made conclusion that the change did occur, while, in fact,
it never did. That is, the essence of the problem is to reach a tradeoff between the loss associated with the
detection delay and the loss associated with false alarms. A good sequential detection procedure is expected
to minimize the average detection delay, subject to a constraint on the false alarm risk.
The particular change-point scenario we study in this work assumes that
f(x) =
1√
2πaµ
exp
{
−(x− µ)
2
2aµ
}
and g(x) = 1√
2πaθ
exp
{
−(x− θ)
2
2aθ
}
, (1.1)
where 0 < a < ∞, 0 < µ 6= θ < ∞, and −∞ < x < ∞. We will refer to this model as the N (µ, aµ)-to-
N (θ, aθ) model. This model can be motivated by several interesting application areas.
First, it arises in the area of Statistical Process Control (SPC) in a sequential estimation context. Sup-
pose a process working in the background on day i > 1 produces iid data {Xi,n}n>1 with unknown mean,
µ, and unknown variance, σ2. Per an internal SPC protocol one would like to estimate µ by construct-
ing a confidence interval for it of prescribed width 2d, d > 0, and prescribed confidence level 1 − α,
0 < α < 1. If σ2 were known, then the required asymptotically (as d → 0) optimal (fixed) sample
size would be N∗α,d = ⌈z2α/2σ2/d2⌉, where ⌈x⌉ is the smallest integer not less than x. Specifically, we
would have limd→0
[
d2N∗α,d/z
2
α/2σ
2
]
= 1, and therefore, limd→0 P(|X¯N∗
α,d
− µ| 6 d) = 1 − α, where
X¯n = (1/n)
∑n
i=1Xi is the sample mean. However, since σ2 is unknown, Chow and Robbins (1965)
proposed the following purely sequential strategy. Let
Nα,d(i) = inf
{
n > mi(> 2): n > z
2
α/2
S2i,n
d2
}
,
where {S2i,n}n>2 is the sample variance computed from {Xi,n}n>1 on day i > 1, and mi is the pilot sample
size on day i > 1. At the end of the i-th day, we get to observe N∗α,d(i), and thus obtain an estimate of N∗α,d.
Note that Nα,d(i), i > 1, is finite w.p. 1. Furthermore, under the sole assumption that 0 < σ2 < ∞, Chow
and Robbins (1965) show that Nα,d(i) is asymptotically (as d→ 0) efficient and consistent. The same result
when the data are Gaussian was also established by Anscombe (1952, 1953). Now, by Mukhopadhyay and
Solanky (1994, Theorem 2.4.1, p. 41), first established by Ghosh and Mukhopadhyay (1975), as d → 0,
the distribution of Nα,d(i) converges to Gaussian with mean N∗α,d and variance aN∗α,d, where a > 0 is
foundable explicitly; for instance, a = 2 when the data are Gaussian. One may additionally refer to Ghosh
et al. (1997, Exercise 2.7.4, p. 66) and Mukhopadhyay and de Silva (2009).
We note that when sampling in multi-steps or under some sort of acceleration parameter 0 < ρ < 1, this
“a” is a function of ρ, and captures how much sampling is done purely sequentially before it is augmented
by batch sampling. See, e.g., Ghosh et al. (1997, Chapter 6).
The main concern is σ2, that is, by trying to hold N∗α,d within reason, one may want to detect changes
in N∗α,d over days. Put otherwise, what if we suddenly see a trend of “larger or smaller than usual” values
of Nα,d(i), i > 1, i.e., estimates of N∗α,d? As d → 0, this becomes precisely model (1.1). This discussion
remains unchanged even when the mean µ = µi, i > 1, is not the same over days.
Second, model (1.1) can find application in telecommunications. Let Xn and Yn be the number of calls
made to location 1 and 2, respectively, on day n > 1. Assume that {Xn}n>1 and {Yn}n>1 are each iid
Poisson with rate λ > 0. At location 1, the number of calls, Xn is recorded internally during the whole
day’s operation between 8:00 AM to 6:00 PM. At location 2, however, the number of calls can be monitored
only during half-the-day, between 8:00 AM to 1:00 PM, e.g., for lack of appropriate fund or staff. How
should one model the aggregate number of calls, i.e., the number of calls from lines 1 and 2 combined?
Since Xn + Yn cannot be observed due to lack of PM staffing, one may instead consider Un = Xn + Yn/2.
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This is reasonable provided the calls are divided approximately equally between the morning and afternoon
shifts. For moderately large λ, however, Un will be approximately Gaussian with mean 3λ/2 and variance
5λ/4. Thus, at the end of day i > 1 one respectively has independent observations U1, U2, . . . recorded
from a N (µ, aµ) distribution with µ = 3λ/2, a = 5/6.
Third, the possibility of approximating the Poisson distribution with Gaussian makes model (1.1) of use
in the area of cybersecurity, specifically in the field of rapid volume-type anomaly detection in computer net-
works traffic. A volume-type traffic anomaly can be caused by many reasons, e.g., by an attack (intrusion), a
virus, a flash crowd, a power outage, or misconfigured network equipment. In all cases it is associated with
a sudden change (usually, from lower to higher) in the traffic’s volume characteristics; the latter may be de-
fined as, e.g., the traffic’s intensity measured via the packet rate – the number of network packets transmitted
through the link per time unit. This number randomly varies with time, and according to latest findings, its
behavior can be well described by a Poisson process; see, e.g., Cao et al. (2002), Karagiannis et al. (2004),
and Vishwanathy et al. (2009). In this case, the average packet rate is nothing but the arrival rate of the Pois-
son process, which undergoes the upsurge triggered by an anomaly. Whether prior to or during an anomaly,
the average packet rate typically measures in the thousands at the lowest, and therefore the parameter of the
Poisson distribution is usually rather large. Hence, one can accurately approximate the Poisson distribution
with a Gaussian one whose mean and variance are both equal to the average packet rate. This is precisely
theN (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model with a = 1. However, in general, behavior of real traffic may deviate from
the Poisson model, and parameter a in the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model can be used as an extra “degree of
freedom” allowing one to take these deviations into account. Thus, the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model is a
more general and better option.
The main objective of this work is to carry out a peer-to-peer comparative multiple-measure performance
analysis of four detection procedures: the CUSUM procedure, the Shiryaev–Roberts (SR) procedure, and
two of its derivatives – the Shiryaev–Roberts–Pollak (SRP) procedure and the Shiryaev–Roberts–r (SR–r)
procedure. The performance measures we are interested in are Pollak’s (1985) Supremum Average Detection
Delay (ADD) and Shiryaev’s (1963) Stationary ADD – each subject to a tolerable lower bound, γ, on the
Average Run Length (ARL) to false alarm. Our intent is to test the asymptotic (as γ →∞) approximations
for each performance index and each procedure of interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally state the problem, introduce
the performance measures and the four procedures; for those with exact optimality properties we also remind
these properties. In Section 3 we discuss the asymptotic properties of the detection procedures and present
the corresponding asymptotic performance approximations. Section 4 describes the methodology of eval-
uating operating characteristics. Section 5 is devoted to the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) change-point scenario.
Specifically, using the methodology of Section 4, we study the performance of each of the four procedures
and examine the accuracy of the corresponding asymptotic approximations. Section 6 is intended to illus-
trate how change-point detection in general and the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model in particular can be used
in cybersecurity for rapid anomaly detection in computer networks. Lastly, Section 7 draws conclusions.
2. OPTIMALITY CRITERIA AND DETECTION PROCEDURES
As indicated in the introduction, the focus of this work is on two formulations of the change-point detection
problem – the minimax formulation and that related to multi-cyclic disorder detection in a stationary regime.
The two, though both stem from the same assumption that the change-point is an unknown (non-random)
number, posit their own optimality criterion.
Suppose there is an “experimenter” who is able to gather, one by one, a series of independent random
observations, {Xn}n>1. Statistically, the series is such that, for some time index ν, which is referred to
as the change-point, X1,X2, . . . ,Xν each posses a known pdf f(x), and Xν+1,Xν+2, . . . are each drawn
from a population with a pdf g(x) 6≡ f(x), also known. The change-point is the unknown serial number of
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the last f(x)-distributed observation; therefore, if ν = ∞, then the entire series {Xn}n>1 is sampled from
distribution with the pdf f(x), and if ν = 0, then all observations are g(x)-distributed. The experimenter’s
objective is to decide that the change is in effect, raise an alarm and respond. The challenge is to make
this decision “as soon as possible” past and “no earlier” than a certain prescribed limit prior to the true
change-point.
Statistically, the problem is to sequentially differentiate between the hypotheses Hk : ν = k > 0, i.e.,
that the change occurs at time moment ν = k, 0 6 k < ∞, and H
∞
: ν = ∞, i.e., that the change never
strikes. Once the k-th observation is made, the experimenter’s decision options are either to accept Hk, and
thus declare that the change has occurred, or to reject Hk and continue observing data.
To test Hk against H∞, one first constructs the corresponding likelihood ratio (LR). Let X1:n =
(X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) be the vector of the first n > 1 observations; then the joint pdf-s of X1:n under Hk
and H
∞
are
p(X1:n|H∞) =
n∏
j=1
f(Xj) and p(X1:n|Hk) =
(
k∏
j=1
f(Xj)
)
×
(
n∏
j=k+1
g(Xj)
)
,
where hereafter it is understood that
∏n
j=k+1 = 1 if k > n; i.e., p(X1:n|H∞) = p(X1:n|Hk) if k > n. For
the LR, Λk:n = p(X1:n|Hk)/p(X1:n|H∞), one then obtains
Λk:n =
n∏
j=k+1
Λj , where Λn =
g(Xn)
f(Xn)
, (2.1)
and we note that Λk:n = 1 if k > n. We also assume that Λ0 = 1.
Next, to decide which of the hypotheses Hk or H∞ is true, the sequence {Λk:n}16k6n is turned into
a detection statistic. To this end, one can either go with the maximum likelihood principle and use the
detection statistic Wn = max16k6nΛk:n (maximal LR) or with the generalized Bayesian approach (limit of
the Bayesian approach) and use the quasi-Bayesian detection statistic Rn =
∑n
k=1Λk:n (average LR with
respect to an improper uniform prior distribution of the change-point). See Polunchenko and Tartakovsky
(2011) for an overview of change-point detection approaches.
Once the detection statistic is chosen, it is supplied to an appropriate sequential detection procedure.
Given the series {Xn}n>1, a detection procedure is defined as a stopping time, T , adapted to the filtration
{Fn}n>0, where Fn = σ(X1:n) is the sigma-algebra generated by the observations collected up to time
instant n > 1. The meaning of T is that after observing X1,X2, . . . ,XT it is declared that the change is in
effect. That may or may not be the case. If it is not, then T 6 ν, and it is said that a false alarm has been
sounded.
The above two detection statistics – {Wn}n>1 and {Rn}n>1 – give raise to a myriad of detection pro-
cedures. The first one we will be interested in is the CUmulative SUM (CUSUM) procedure. This is a
maximum LR-based “inspection scheme” proposed by Page (1954) to help solve issues arising in the area
of industrial quality control. Currently, the CUSUM procedure is the de facto “workhorse” in a number of
branches of engineering. Formally, we define the CUSUM procedure as the stopping time
CA = inf{n > 1: Wn > A}, (2.2)
where A > 0 is the detection threshold, and Wn = max16k6nΛk:n is the CUSUM statistic, which can also
be defined recursively as
Wn = max{1,Wn−1}Λn, n > 1 with W0 = 1, (2.3)
Hereafter in the definitions of stopping times inf{∅} =∞.
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Another detection procedure we will consider is the the Shiryaev–Roberts (SR) procedure. In contrast
to the CUSUM procedure, the SR procedure is based on the quasi-Bayesian argument. It is due to the
independent work of Shiryaev (1961, 1963) and Roberts (1966). Specifically, Shiryaev introduced this
procedure in continuous time in the context of detecting a change in the drift of a Brownian motion, and
Roberts addressed the discrete-time problem of detecting a shift in the mean of a sequence of independent
Gaussian random variables. Formally, the SR procedure is defined as the stopping time
SA = inf{n > 1: Rn > A}, (2.4)
where A > 0 is the detection threshold, and Rn =
∑n
k=1Λk:n is the SR statistic, which can also be
computed recursively as
Rn = (1 +Rn−1)Λn, n > 1 with R0 = 0, (2.5)
Note that the SR statistic starts from zero.
We will also be interested in two derivatives of the SR procedure: the Shiryaev–Roberts–Pollak (SRP)
procedure and the Shiryaev–Roberts–r (SR–r) procedure. The former is due to Pollak (1985) whose idea
was to start the SR detection statistic, {Rn}n>0, not from zero, but from a random point R0 = RQ0 , where
RQ0 is sampled from the quasi-stationary distribution QA(x) = limn→∞ P∞(Rn 6 x|SA > n) of the SR
detection statistic under the hypothesis H
∞
. (Note that {Rn}n>0 is a Markov Harris-recurrent process under
H
∞
.) Formally, the SRP procedure is defined as the stopping time
SQA = inf{n > 1: RQn > A}, (2.6)
where A > 0 is the detection threshold, and RQn is the SRP detection statistic given by the recursion
RQn = (1 +R
Q
n−1)Λn, n > 1 with R
Q
0 ∝ QA(x). (2.7)
The SR–r procedure was proposed by Moustakides et al. (2011) who regard starting off the original SR
detection statistic, {Rn}n>0, from a fixed (but specially designed) R0 = r, 0 6 r < A, and defining the
stopping time with this new deterministic initialization as
SrA = inf{n > 1: Rrn > A}, (2.8)
where A > 0 is the detection threshold and the SR–r detection statistic Rrn is given by the recursion
Rrn = (1 +R
r
n−1)Λn, n > 1 with Rr0 = r > 0, (2.9)
Note that for r = 0 this is nothing but the conventional SR procedure.
We now proceed with reviewing the optimality criteria whereby one decides which procedure to use.
We first set down some additional notation. Let Pν(·) be the probability measure generated by the obser-
vations {Xn}n>1 when the change-point is ν > 0, and Eν [ · ] be the corresponding expectation. Likewise,
let P
∞
(·) and E
∞
[ · ] denote the same under the no-change scenario, i.e., when ν =∞.
Consider first the minimax formulation proposed by Lorden (1971) where the risk of raising a false
alarm is measured by the ARL to false alarm ARL(T ) = E
∞
[T ] and the delay to detection by the “worst-
worst-case” ADD JL(T ) = sup06ν<∞{ess supEν [(T − ν)+|Fν ]}, where hereafter x+ = max{0, x}. Let
∆(γ) = {T : ARL(T ) > γ} be the class of detection procedures (stopping times) for which the ARL
to false alarm does not fall below a given (desired and a priori set) level γ > 1. Lorden’s version of the
minimax optimization problem is to find Topt ∈ ∆(γ) such that JL(Topt) = infT∈∆(γ) JL(T ) for every
γ > 1. For the iid model, this problem was solved by Moustakides (1986), who showed that the solution is
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the CUSUM procedure. Specifically, if we select the detection threshold A = Aγ from the solution of the
equation ARL(CAγ ) = γ, then JL(CAγ ) = infT∈∆(γ) JL(T ) for every γ > 1.
Though CUSUM’s strict JL(T )-optimality is a strong result, ideal for engineering purposes would be to
have a procedure that minimizes the average (conditional) detection delay, ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν],
for all ν > 0 simultaneously. As no such uniformly optimal procedure is possible, Pollak (1985) suggested
to revise Lorden’s version of minimax optimality by replacing JL(T ) with JP(T ) = sup06ν<∞ADDν(T ),
i.e., with the worst average (conditional) detection delay, and seek Topt ∈ ∆(γ) such that JP(Topt) =
infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) for every γ > 1. We believe that this problem has higher applied potential than Lorden’s.
Contrary to the latter, an exact solution to Pollak’s minimax problem is still an open question. See, e.g., Pol-
lak (1985), Polunchenko and Tartakovsky (2010), Moustakides et al. (2011), and Tartakovsky et al. (2011)
for a related study.
Note that Lorden’s and Pollak’s versions of the minimax formulation both assume that the detection
procedure is applied only once; the result is either a false alarm, or a correct (though delayed) detection, and
no data sampling is done past the stopping point. This is known as the single-run paradigm. Yet another
formulation emerges if one considers applying the same procedure in cycles, e.g., starting anew after every
false alarm. This is the multi-cyclic formulation.
Specifically, the idea is to assume that in exchange for the assurance that the change will be detected with
maximal speed, the experimenter agrees to go through a “storm” of false alarms along the way. The false
alarms are ensued from repeatedly applying the same detection rule, starting from scratch after each false
alarm. Put otherwise, suppose the change-point, ν, is substantially larger than the desired level of the ARL
to false alarm, γ > 1. That is, the change occurs in a distant future and it is preceded by a stationary flow
of false alarms; the ARL to false alarm in this context is the mean time between consecutive false alarms.
As argued by Pollak and Tartakovsky (2009), this comes in handy in many surveillance applications, in
particular in the area of cybersecurity which will be addressed in Section 6.
Formally, let T1, T2, . . . denote sequential independent applications of the same stopping time T , and let
T(j) = T(1) + T(2) + · · · + T(j) be the time of the j-th alarm, j > 1. Let Iν = min{j > 1: T(j) > ν}
so that T(Iν) is the point of detection of the true change, which occurs at time instant ν after Iν − 1 false
alarms have been raised. Consider JST(T ) = limν→∞ Eν [T(Iν) − ν], i.e., the limiting value of the ADD
that we will refer to as the stationary ADD (STADD); then the multi-cyclic optimization problem consists
in finding Topt ∈ ∆(γ) such that JST(Topt) = infT∈∆(γ) JST(T ) for every γ > 1. For the continuos-time
Brownian motion model, this formulation was first proposed by Shiryaev (1961, 1963) who showed that
the SR procedure is strictly optimal. For the discrete-time iid model, optimality of the SR procedure in this
setting was solved recently by Pollak and Tartakovsky (2009). Specifically, introduce the integral average
detection delay
IADD(T ) =
∞∑
ν=0
Eν [(T − ν)+], (2.10)
and the relative integral average detection delay JGB(T ) = IADD(T )/ARL(T ). If the detection threshold,
A, is set to Aγ , the solution of the equation ARL(SAγ ) = γ, then JGB(SAγ ) = infT∈∆(γ) JGB(T ) for every
γ > 1. Also JGB(T ) ≡ JST(T ) for any stopping time T , so that JST(SAγ ) = infT∈∆(γ) JST(T ) for every
γ > 1.
We conclude this section reiterating that our goal is to test the above four procedures – CUSUM, SR,
SRP and SR–r – against each other with respect to two measures of detection delay – JP(T ) and JST(T ).
We will also analyze the accuracy of the asymptotic approximations which are introduced in the next section.
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3. ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY AND PERFORMANCE APPROXIMATIONS
To remind, we focus on Pollak’s minimax formulation of minimizing the maximal ADD and on the multi-
cyclic formulation of minimizing the stationary ADD. We also indicated that the latter is a solved problem
(and the solution is the SR procedure), while the former is still an open question. The usual way around
is to consider the asymptotic case γ → ∞. The hope is to design a procedure, T ∗opt ∈ ∆(γ), such that
JP(T ∗opt) and the (unknown) optimum, infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ), will be in some sense “close” to each other in
the limit, as γ → ∞. To this end, three different types of JP(T ∗opt)-to-infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) convergence are
generally distinguished: a) A procedure T ∗opt ∈ ∆(γ) is said to be first-order asymptotically JP(T )-optimal
in the class ∆(γ) if JP(T ∗opt) = [infT∈∆(γ) JP(T )][1 + o(1)], as γ → ∞, where hereafter o(1) → 0,
as γ → ∞, b) second-order – if JP(T ∗opt) = infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) + O(1), as γ → ∞, where O(1) stays
bounded, as γ → ∞, and c) third-order – if JP(T ∗opt) = infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) + o(1), as γ → ∞. Note that
infT∈∆(γ) J (T )→∞ as γ →∞.
We now review our four procedures’ individual asymptotic optimality properties and provide the cor-
responding asymptotic approximations for ARL(T ) = E
∞
[T ], JP(T ) = sup06ν<∞ADDν(T ) (where
ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν]), ADD∞(T ) = limν→∞ADDν(T ), and JST(T ). Let Zi = log Λi
and let If = −E∞[Z1] and Ig = E0[Z1] denote the Kullback–Leibler information numbers. Hence-
forth, it will be assumed that Z1 is P∞- and P0-nonarithmetic and that 0 < If < ∞ and 0 < Ig < ∞.
Throughout the rest of the paper we will also assume the second moment conditions E∞ |Z1|2 < ∞ and
E0 |Z1|2 < ∞. Further, introduce the random walk {Sn}n>0, where Sn =
∑n
j=1 Zi, n > 1, with S0 = 0.
Let V˜
∞
=
∑
∞
j=1 e
−Sj
, and define Q˜(x) = P0(V˜∞ 6 x). Next, for a > 0, introduce the one-sided stopping
time τa = inf{n > 1: Sn > a} and let κa = Sτa − a denote the overshoot (i.e., the excess of Sn over the
level a at stopping). Define ζ = lima→∞ E0[e−κa ] and κ = lima→∞ E0[κa]. It can be shown that
ζ =
1
Ig
exp
{
−
∞∑
k=1
1
k
[
P
∞
(Sk > 0) + P0(Sk 6 0)
]}
and κ = E0[Z
2
1 ]
2E0[Z1]
−
∞∑
k=1
1
k
E0[S
−
k ], (3.1)
where hereafter x− = −min(0, x); cf., e.g., Woodroofe (1982, Chapters 2 & 3) and Siegmund (1985,
Chapter VIII).
We are now poised to discuss optimality properties and approximations for the operating character-
istics of the four detection procedures of interest. We begin with the CUSUM procedure. First, from
the fact that JL(CA) = JP(CA) = ADD0(CA) and the work of Lorden (1971) one can deduce that the
CUSUM procedure is first-order asymptotically JP(T )-optimal. However, in fact it is second-order JP(T )-
minimax which can be established as follows. Since CUSUM is strictly optimal in the sense of minimizing
the essential supremum ADD JL(T ), which is equal to ADD0 for both CUSUM and SR, it is clear that
ADD0(CA) < ADD0(SA), where the thresholds are different for CUSUM and SR to attain the same ARL
to false alarm γ. By Tartakovsky et al. (2011), the SR procedure is second-order asymptotically mini-
max with respect to JP(T ), so that CUSUM is also second-order asymptotically JP(T )-optimal. Now, let
A = Aγ , where Aγ is the solution of the equation ARL(CAγ ) = γ. Then
JP(CAγ ) =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ + β0) + o(1), as γ →∞, (3.2)
where β0 = E0[minn>0 Sn]. We iterate that JP(CA) = E0[CA]. This asymptotic expansion was first
obtained by Dragalin (1994) for the single-parameter exponential family, but it holds in a general case too as
long as the second moment condition E0[Z21 ] <∞ is satisfied and Z1 is P0-non-arithmetic. See Tartakovsky
(2005), who also shows that
ADD
∞
(CAγ ) =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − β∞) + o(1), as γ →∞, (3.3)
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where β
∞
= limn→∞ E∞[Sn −min06k6n Sk]; constants β0 and β∞ can be computed numerically (e.g., by
Monte Carlo simulations). An accurate approximation for the ARL to false alarm is as follows:
ARL(CA) ≈ A
Igζ2
− logA
If
− 1
Igζ
. (3.4)
We now proceed to the SR procedure. First, recall that, by Pollak and Tartakovsky (2009), this procedure
is a strictly optimal multi-cyclic procedure in the sense of minimizing the stationary ADD. The following
lower bound for the minimal SADD is fundamental for the analysis carried out in Section 5: for every r > 0,
inf
T∈∆(γ)
JP(T ) > JLB(SrAγ ) =
rADD0[SrAγ ] + IADD(SrAγ )
r +ARL(SrAγ )
, (3.5)
where Aγ is the solution of the equation ARL(SrAγ ) = γ, γ > 1 (see Moustakides et al. 2011 and Pol-
unchenko and Tartakovsky 2010). Taking r = 0 in (3.5), we obtain infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) > JST(SAγ ).
Let R
∞
be a random variable that has the P
∞
-limiting (stationary) distribution of Rn as n → ∞, i.e.,
QST(x) = limn→∞ P∞(Rn 6 x) = P∞(R∞ 6 x). Let V =
∑
∞
k=1 e
−Sk and Q˜(x) = P0(V 6 x). Let
C
∞
= E[log(1 +R
∞
+ V˜ )] =
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
log(1 + x+ y) dQST(x) dQ˜(y). (3.6)
By Tartakovsky et al. (2011),
JST(SAγ ) =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − C∞) + o(1), as γ →∞,
so that
inf
T∈∆(γ)
JP(T ) > 1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − C∞) + o(1), as γ →∞. (3.7)
On the other hand, a straightforward argument shows that, for the SR procedure, if A = Aγ is the solution
of the equation ARL(SAγ ) = γ, then ARL(SAγ ) = γ ≈ Aγ/ζ and
JP(SAγ ) = E0[SAγ ] =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − C0) + o(1), as γ →∞, (3.8)
where
C0 = E[log(1 + V˜∞)] =
∫
∞
0
log(1 + x) dQ˜(x)
(cf. Tartakovsky et al. (2011)). Since C0 < C∞, it follows that the SR procedure is second-order minimax,
the fact that we have already mentioned above when considering CUSUM. The difference is (C∞−C0)/Ig ,
which can be quite large when detecting small changes.
For an arbitrary scenario, the constant C0 and distribution Q˜(x) are amenable to numerical treatment.
For cases where both can be computed exactly in a closed form see Tartakovsky et al. (2011) and Pol-
unchenko and Tartakovsky (2011). The approximation ARL(CA) ≈ A/ζ is known to be very accurate
and is therefore recommended for practical use; it can be derived from the the fact that {Rn − n}n>0 is a
zero-mean P
∞
-martingale.
We now consider the SRP procedure. From decision theory (see, e.g., Ferguson, 1967, Theorem 2.11.3)
it is known that the minimax procedure should be an equalizer, i.e., ADDν(T ) should be the same for all
ν > 0. To make the SR procedure an equalizer, Pollak (1985) suggested to start the SR detection statistic,
{Rn}n>0, from a random point distributed according to the quasi-stationary distribution. However, Pollak
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was able to demonstrate that the SRP procedure is only asymptotically third-order JP(T )-optimal. More
specifically, let E0[Z+1 ] < ∞, and suppose that the detection threshold, A, is set to Aγ , the solution of
the equation ARL(SQAγ ) = γ. Then JP(S
Q
Aγ
) = infT∈∆(γ) JP(T ) + o(1), as γ → ∞. Recently, Tar-
takovsky et al. (2011) obtained an asymptotic approximation for JP(SQA ) under the second moment condi-
tion E0[Z21 ] <∞:
JP(SQAγ ) =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − C∞) + o(1), as γ →∞, (3.9)
and we note that JP(SQA ) = ADDν(SQA ) for all ν > 0, and JP(SQA ) = JST(SQA ). To approximate
ARL(SQA ), Tartakovsky et al. (2011) suggest to use the formula ARL(SQA ) ≈ A/ζ − µQ, where µQ =∫ A
0 x dQA(x) is the mean of the quasi-stationary distribution.
It is left to consider the SR–r procedure. Since this procedure is sensitive to the choice of the starting
point, we first discuss the question of how to design this point. To this end, fundamental is the lower bound
for the minimal SADD given in (3.5). From (3.5) one can deduce that if the starting point Rr0 = r∗ is chosen
so that the SR–r procedure is an equalizer (i.e., ADDν(Sr∗A ) is the same for all ν > 0), then it will be exactly
JP(T )-optimal. Indeed, if the SR–r procedure is an equalizer, then JLB(Sr∗A ) = E0[Sr
∗
A ] = JP(Sr
∗
A ). This
argument was exploited by Polunchenko and Tartakovsky (2010), who found change-point scenarios where
ARL(SrA), ADDν(SrA), ν > 0, and r∗ can be obtained in a closed form and the SR−r procedure with
r = r∗ is strictly optimal. In general, Moustakides et al. (2011) suggest to set the starting point to the
solution of the following constraint minimization problem:
r∗ = arg inf
06r<∞
{JP(SrA)− JLB(SrA)} subject to ARL(SrA) = γ. (3.10)
We discuss this approach in detail in Section 5 where we also discuss certain properties of r∗, as well as
another approach that allows one to obtain a nearly optimal result for the low false alarm rate.
As shown by Tartakovsky et al. (2011), the SR–r procedure also enjoys the third-order asymptotic
optimality property. Specifically, assume that the detection threshold A = Aγ is the solution of the equation
ARL(SrAγ ) = γ and the head start r (either fixed or growing at the rate of o(γ)) is selected in such a way
that ARL(SrAγ ) ≈ Aγ/ζ and that the supremum ADD JP(SrAγ ) is attained at infinity, i.e., JP(SrAγ ) =
ADD
∞
(SrAγ ). Then
JP(SrAγ ) = ADD∞(SrAγ ) =
1
Ig
(logAγ + κ − C∞) + o(1), as γ →∞. (3.11)
Comparing with the lower bound (3.7) we see that in this case the SR−r procedure is nearly optimal (within
the negligible term o(1)). For practical purposes, to approximate ARL(SrA) one may use the formula
ARL(SrA) ≈ A/ζ−r, which is rather accurate, and can be easily obtained from the fact that {Rrn−n−r}n>0
is a zero-mean P
∞
-martingale.
4. NUMERICAL TECHNIQUES FOR EVALUATION OF OPERATING CHARACTER-
ISTICS
In this section we present integral equations for operating characteristics of change detection procedures as
well as outline numerical techniques for solving these equations that can be effectively used for performance
evaluation. Further details can be found in Moustakides et al. (2011).
Consider a generic detection procedure described by the stopping time
T sA = inf{n > 1: V sn > A}, A > 0. (4.1)
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where {V sn }n>0 is a generic Markov detection statistic that follows the recursion
V sn = ξ(V
s
n−1)Λn, n > 1 with V s0 = s > 0. (4.2)
Here ξ(x) is a non-negative function and s is a fixed parameter, referred to as the starting point or the head
start.
The above generic stopping time describes a rather broad class of detection procedures; in particular,
all considered procedures belong to this class. Indeed, for the CUSUM procedure ξ(x) = max{1, x} and
for the SR-type procedures ξ(x) = 1 + x. This universality of T sA enables one to evaluate practically any
Operating Characteristic (OC) of any procedure that is a special case of T sA, merely by picking the right
ξ(x). We now provide a set of exact integral equations on all major OC-s for T sA .
Recall that Λn = g(Xn)/f(Xn), n > 1, and assume that Λ1 is continuous. For d = {0,∞}, let
PΛd (t) = Pd(Λ1 6 t) denote the cdf of the LR. Let
Kd(x, y) = ∂
∂y
Pd(V
s
n+1 6 y|V sn = x) =
∂
∂y
PΛd
(
y
ξ(x)
)
, d = {0,∞}
denote the transition probability density kernel for the Markov process {V sn }n>1. Note that dPΛ0 (t) =
t dPΛ
∞
(t), and therefore, K0(x, y)/K∞(x, y) = y/ξ(x), which can be used as a “shortcut” in deriving the
formula for K0(x, y) from that for K∞(x, y) or vice versa.
Suppose that V x0 = x is fixed. Let ℓ(x) = E∞[T xA ] and δ0(x) = E0[T xA ]. It can be shown that ℓ(x) and
δ0(x) satisfy the renewal equations
ℓ(x) = 1 +
∫ A
0
K
∞
(x, y) ℓ(y) dy and δ0(x) = 1 +
∫ A
0
K0(x, y) δ0(y) dy, (4.3)
respectively (cf. Moustakides et al. (2011)). Next, consider ADDν(T xA ) = Eν [T xA − ν|T xA > ν] for an
arbitrary fixed ν > 1; note that ADD0(T xA ) ≡ δ0(x). To evaluate ADDν(T xA ), Moustakides et al. (2011) first
argue that Pν(T xA > ν) = P∞(T xA > ν), and consequently, ADDν(T xA ) = Eν [(T xA − ν)+] /P∞(T xA > ν),
so that we turn attention to δν(x) = Eν [(T xA − ν)+] and ρν(x) = P∞(T xA > ν). It is direct to see that
δν(x) =
∫ A
0
K
∞
(x, y) δν−1(y) dy and ρν(x) =
∫ A
0
K
∞
(x, y) ρν−1(y) dy, ν > 1,
where δ0(x) is as in (4.3) and ρ0(x) ≡ 1, since P∞(T xA > 0) ≡ 1; cf. Moustakides et al. (2011). As soon as
δν(x) and ρν(x) are found, by the above argument ADDν(T xA ) can be evaluated as the ratio δν(x)/ρν(x).
Furthermore, using ADDν(T xA )’s computed for sufficiently many successive ν’s beginning from ν = 0 and
higher, one can also evaluate JP(T xA ) = sup06ν<∞ADDν(T xA ), since ADD∞(T xA ) = limν→∞ADDν(T xA )
is independent of V x0 = x.
We now proceed to the stationary average detection delay JST(T ). It follows from Pollak and Tar-
takovsky (2009) that the STADD is equal to the relative integral ADD:
JST(T xA ) =
(
∞∑
ν=0
Eν [(T xA − ν)+]
) /
E
∞
[T xA ],
and if we let ψ(x) =
∑
∞
ν=0 Eν [(T xA − ν)+] =
∑
∞
ν=0 δν(x), then JST(T xA ) = ψ(x)/ℓ(x). It can be shown
that ψ(x) satisfies
ψ(x) = δ0(x) +
∫ A
0
K
∞
(x, y)ψ(y) dy, (4.4)
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where δ0(x) is as in (4.3).
The IADD is also involved in the lower bound JLB(T ) which is defined in (3.5) and is specific to
the SR–r procedure, i.e., for the case when ξ(x) = 1 + x. Assuming this choice of ξ(x), observe that
JLB(SrA) = [rδ0(r) + ψ(r)]/[r + ℓ(r)], which can be evaluated once ℓ(x), δ0(x), and ψ(x) are found.
Consider now randomizing the starting point V x0 = x in a fashion analogous that behind the SRP
stopping time. Let QA(x) = limn→∞ P∞(V sn 6 x|T sA > n) be quasi-stationary distribution; note that this
distribution exists, as guaranteed by (Harris, 1963, Theorem III.10.1). Let T QA = inf{n > 1: V Qn > A},
where {V Qn }n>0 is a randomized generic detection statistic such that V Qn = ξ(V Qn−1)Λn for n > 1 with
V Q0 ∝ QA. Note that T QA is the SRP procedure when ξ(x) = 1 + x.
For T QA , any OC is dependent upon the quasi-stationary distribution. We therefore first state the equation
that determines the quasi-stationary pdf qA(x) = dQA(x)/dx:
λA qA(y) =
∫ A
0
qA(x)K∞(x, y) dx, subject to
∫ A
0
qA(x) dx = 1 (4.5)
(cf. Moustakides et al. (2011) and Pollak (1985)). We note that qA(x) and λA are both unique. Once
qA(x) and λA are found, one can compute the ARL to false alarm ℓ¯ = E∞[T QA ] and the detection delay
δ¯ = E0[T QA ], which is independent from the change-point:
ℓ¯ =
∫ A
0
ℓ(x) qA(x) dx = 1/(1 − λA) and δ¯ =
∫ A
0
δ0(x) qA(x) dx.
The second equality in the above formula for ℓ¯ is due to the fact that, by design, the P
∞
-distribution of
the discrete random variable T QA is exactly geometric with parameter 1− λA, 0 < λA < 1, i.e., P∞(T QA >
ν) = λνA, ν > 0; in general, limA→∞ λA = 1. Also, Pollak and Tartakovsky (2011) provide sufficient
conditions for λA to be an increasing function of A; in particular, they show that if the cdf of Z1 = log Λ1
under measure P
∞
(·) is concave, λA is increasing in A.
Equations (4.3)–(4.5) govern all of the desired performance measures (OC-s) for all considered detec-
tion procedures. The final question is that of solving these equations to evaluate the OC-s. Usually these
equation cannot be solved analytically, so that a numerical solver is in order. We will rely on one offered
by Moustakides et al. (2011). Specifically, it is a piecewise-constant (zero-order polynomial) collocation
method with the interval of integration [0, A] partitioned into N > 1 equally long subintervals. The collo-
cation nodes are the subintervals’ middle points. As the simplest case of the piecewise collocation method
(see, e.g., Atkinson and Han, 2009, Chapter 12), the question of accuracy is a well-understood one, and tight
error bounds can be easily obtained from, e.g., (Atkinson and Han, 2009, Theorem 12.1.2). Specifically, it
can be shown that the uniform L
∞
norm of the difference between the exact solution and the approximate
one is O(1/N), provided N is sufficiently large.
We are now in a position to apply the above performance evaluation methodology to the N (µ, aµ)-to-
N (θ, aθ) change-point scenario, and compute and compare against one another the performance of the four
detection procedures.
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we utilize the performance evaluation methodology of the preceding section for theN (µ, aµ)-
to-N (θ, aθ) change-point scenario (1.1) and evaluate operating characteristics of four detection procedures.
We first describe how we performed the computations and then report and discuss the obtained results.
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We start with deriving pre- and post-change distributions PΛd (t) = Pd(Λ1 6 t), d = {0,∞} of the LR.
It can be seen that
Λn =
g(Xn)
f(Xn)
=
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
exp
{
θ − µ
2aθµ
X2n
}
,
and
Λn >
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
, if θ − µ > 0, and Λn 6
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
, if θ − µ < 0.
Observe that to obtain the required distributions, one is to consider separately two cases θ − µ > 0 and
θ− µ < 0. Analytically, both cases can be treated in a similar manner, so that we present the details only in
the first case.
Let θ − µ > 0. For any measure P(·) it is straightforward to see that
P(Λn 6 t) = P
(
Xn 6
√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
−
− P
(
Xn 6 −
√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
,
for t >
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
,
and P(Λn 6 t) = 0 otherwise.
Hence,
PΛ
∞
(t) = Φµ,aµ
(√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
−
− Φµ,aµ
(
−
√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
,
for t >
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
,
and PΛ
∞
(t) = 0 otherwise; hereafter,
Φµ,σ2(x) =
∫ x
−∞
1√
2πσ2
exp
{
−(t− µ)
2
2σ2
}
dt
is the cdf of a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
Similarly,
PΛ0 (t) = Φθ,aθ
(√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
−
− Φθ,aθ
(
−
√
θµ
[(
2 log t− log µ
θ
)
/(θ − µ) + 1
])
,
for t >
√
µ
θ
exp
{
−θ − µ
2a
}
,
and PΛ0 (t) = 0 otherwise.
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As soon as both distributions, PΛ0 (t) and PΛ∞(t), are expressed in a closed form, one is ready to employ
the numerical method of Moustakides et al. (2011). We implemented the method in MATLAB, and solved
the corresponding equations with an accuracy of a fraction of a percent.
It is also easily seen that the Kullback–Leibler information numbers If = −E∞[log Λ1] and Ig =
E0[log Λ1] are
If =
(µ− θ)2
2aθ
+
1
2
[(µ
θ
− 1
)
− log µ
θ
]
and Ig =
(θ − µ)2
2aµ
+
1
2
[(
θ
µ
− 1
)
− log θ
µ
]
.
Also, for this model, we have
Sk =
k∑
j=1
log Λj =
θ − µ
2µ
k∑
j=1
X2j
aθ
− k
2
[
θ − µ
a
+ log
θ
µ
]
, k > 1.
We now consider the question of computing κ and ζ . To this end, in general both can be computed either
using (3.1), or by Monte Carlo simulations. However, in our particular case, the latter is better since each Sk
is non-central chi-squared distributed, and this distribution is an infinite series, which is slowly converging
for weak changes, i.e., when θ and µ are close to each other. This translates into a computational issue.
Hence, κ and ζ as well as C0 and C∞ are all evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations.
Specifically, to compute κ and ζ we generate 106 trajectories of Sk for k ranging from 1 to 104 for each
measure Pd(·), d = {0,∞}, and estimate κ and ζ using (3.1). That is, we cut the infinite series appearing
in both formulae at 104. The same data are used to compute constants β0 and β∞, as well as constants C0
and C
∞
. We directly estimate the corresponding integrals, which is a textbook Monte Carlo problem.
One of the most important issues is the design of the SR–r procedure, namely, choosing the starting
point r. As we discussed in Section 3, the head start Rr0 = r∗ should be set to the solution of the con-
strained minimization problem (3.10). Clearly, with this initialization the SADD of the SR–r procedure is
as close to the optimum as possible. The challenge is that unlike other procedures, one cannot determine
the detection threshold from the equation ARL(SrA) = γ for the desired γ > 1, even using the approxi-
mation ARL(SrA) ≈ (A/ζ) − r. The reason is that we now have two unknowns – A and r. This is where
r∗ steps in. For a fixed γ, it is clear that as A grows, in order to maintain ARL(SrA) at the same level γ
(i.e., to keep the constraint ARL(SrA) = γ satisfied), r has to grow as well. The smallest value of r is 0,
and when r = 0, we can easily determine the (smallest) value of A for which ARL(SrA) = γ, because in
this case it is the SR procedure, and ARL(SA) ≈ A/ζ . Once this A is found, we compute JP(SrA) and
JLB(SrA), and record the difference JP(SrA)−JLB(SrA). Then we increase the detection threshold, and find
r for which ARL(SrA) = γ is satisfied, and again compute JP(SrA) and JLB(SrA), and record the difference
JP(SrA)− JLB(SrA). This process continues until enough data is collected to figure out what A and r∗ are.
See also Polunchenko and Tartakovsky (2011, Section 5).
Though r∗ is an intuitively appealing initialization strategy, it is interesting only from a theoretical point
of view. For practical purposes, Tartakovsky et al. (2011) suggest to choose r so as to equate ADD0(SrA)
and ADD
∞
(SrA). This is the expected behavior of the SR–r procedure for large A’s, and we in fact also do
observe it for our example. For large values of A, ADD0(SrA) can be approximated as
ADD0(SrA) ≈
1
Ig
(logA+ κ − Cr),
where
Cr = E[log(1 + r + V˜∞)] =
∫
∞
0
log(1 + r + y) dQ˜(y),
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and V˜
∞
and Q˜(y) are as in Section 3. We also recall that ADD
∞
(SrA) = JP(SrA) admits the same asymp-
totics (3.11), except Cr is replaced with C∞ defined in (3.6). Hence, for large values of A, the equation
ADD0(SrA) = ADD∞(SrA), where the unknown is r, reduces to the equation Cr = C∞. Let r⋆ be its
solution. The important feature of r⋆ compared to r∗ is that it does not depend of the threshold (i.e., on γ).
Tartakovsky et al. (2011) and Polunchenko and Tartakovsky (2011) offer an example where Cr and C∞ can
be found in a closed form, and the equation Cr = C∞ can be written out and solved explicitly.
As a first illustration, suppose µ = 1000, θ = 1001, and a = 0.01, and set γ = 104 for each procedure in
question. The corresponding detection threshold and head start r∗ for each procedure are reported in Table 1.
For this case we have If ≈ 5 × 10−2, Ig ≈ 5 × 10−2, ζ ≈ 0.83145, κ ≈ 0.22, C0 ≈ 3.59, C∞ ≈ 4.5,
β0 ≈ −1, and β∞ ≈ 1.3. We see that for the SR procedure the asymptotics ARL(SA) ≈ A/ζ is again
perfect. The accuracy is great for the SRP rule as well: the asymptotics ARL(SQA ) ≈ A/ζ − µQ yields
a value of 9999.5 average observations, while the computed value is 9999.845. For the SR–r procedure,
the asymptotics ARL(SrA) ≈ A/ζ − r yields a value of 9999.57 average observations, while the computed
value is 9999.875. For the CUSUM procedure, the approximation for the ARL (3.4) gives a value of 10006,
while the computed one is 10001.22.
Table 1. Thresholds, head start values and the ARL to false alarm for the four detection procedures for
µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 0.01, and γ = 104. ARL(T ) is the actual ARL to false alarm exhibited
by the procedure for the selected detection threshold and head start evaluated numerically
Procedure A Head Start ARL(T ) = E
∞
[T ]
CUSUM 350.75 any W0 6 1 10001.223
SR 8314.4 R0 = 0 10000.188
SRP 8392.0 RQ0 ∝ QA (µQ ≈ 93.699) 9999.845
SR–r 8356.0 Rr0 ≈ 50.345 9999.875
While not presented in this table, we now discuss the accuracy of the asymptotic approximations given
in Section 3. The asymptotics for JP(SA) given by (3.8) yields a value of 117, which aligns well with the
observed 113. For the CUSUM procedure we obtain that the approximation for JP(CA) (see (3.2)) gives
101 vs. 105 observed. For ADD
∞
(CA) given in (3.3) we have 93 vs. 95 observed. For the approximations
JP(SQA ), JP(SrA) and ADD∞(SrA) (see (3.9) and (3.11)) we have 93 vs. 95 observed. We can conclude that
the accuracy of asymptotic approximations is satisfactory.
Next, the ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν] vs. the changepoint ν is shown in Figure 1. We first discuss
the procedures’ performance for changes that take place either immediately (i.e., ν = 0), or in the near
to mid-term future. As we have mentioned earlier, for the CUSUM and SR procedures the worst ADD is
attained at ν = 0, i.e., JP(CA) = E0[CA] and JP(SA) = E0[SA]. From Figure 1 we gather that at ν = 0
the average delay of the CUSUM procedure is 105 observations and of the SR procedure is 113. Overall,
we see that the CUSUM procedure is superior to the SR procedure for 0 6 ν 6 60; the two procedures are
at performance parity at ν = 60. One can therefore conclude that the CUSUM procedure is better than the
SR rule for changes that occur either immediately, or in the near to mid-term future. However, for distant
changes (i.e., when ν is large), it is the opposite, as expected. Below we will consider one more case where
the SR procedure significantly outperforms the CUSUM procedure. For now note that the only procedure
indifferent to how soon or late the change may take place is the SRP procedure SQA ; recall that it is an
equalizer, i.e., ADDν(SQA ) is the same for all ν > 0. The (flat) ADD for the SRP procedure is 94. Since
γ = 104, SRP and SR–r are nearly indistinguishable. Yet SR−r appears to be uniformly (though slightly)
better than SRP.
The obtained ADDν(T ) for each procedure for selected values of ν are summarized in Table 2. The table
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Figure 1. Conditional average detection delay ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν] for the four detection proce-
dures for µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 0.01, and γ = 104 versus the changepoint ν.
also reports the lower bound (3.5) and the STADD JST(T ). From the table we see that for the considered
parameters all procedures deliver about the same STADD.
Table 2. Summary of the performance of the four procedures for µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 0.01, and
γ = 104
ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν]
Procedure 0 50 100 150 200 JST(T )
CUSUM
104.98
(SADD) 96.72 95.75 95.57 95.53 95.55
SR
112.87
(SADD) 97.26 94.75 94.15 94.00 94.00
SRP 94.127 (SADD)
SR–r 93.38 94.04 94.04 94.04 94.04(SADD) 94.04
Lower Bound 94.04
As another illustration, suppose µ = 1000, θ = 1001, but a = 1. Also, assume that γ = 103. The
corresponding detection threshold and head start for each procedure are reported in Table 3. For this case
we have If ≈ 5 × 10−4, Ig ≈ 5 × 10−4, ζ ≈ 0.981, κ ≈ 1.55, C0 ≈ 8.08 and C∞ ≈ 8.82, β0 ≈ −2.1
and β
∞
≈ 2.2. We see that for the SR procedure the asymptotics ARL(SA) ≈ A/ζ is perfect. However,
the accuracy is not as great for the SRP rule: the asymptotics ARL(SQA ) ≈ A/ζ − µQ yields a value of
929.72, while the computed value is 1000.33. For the SR–r procedure, the accuracy is slightly off as well:
the asymptotics ARL(SrA) ≈ A/ζ − r yields 930.72, while the computed one is 999.98. For the CUSUM
procedure, approximation (3.4) gives 1358.3, while the computed one is 1000.1.
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Table 3. Thresholds, head start values and the ARL to false alarm for the four detection procedures for
µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 1, and γ = 103. ARL(T ) is the actual ARL to false alarm exhibited by
the procedure for the selected detection threshold and head start evaluated numerically
Procedure A Head Start ARL(T ) = E
∞
[T ]
CUSUM 2.272 any W0 6 1 1000.096
SR 981.0 R0 = 0 999.996
SRP 1844.0 RQ0 ∝ QA (µQ ≈ 879.248) 1000.333
SR–r 1811.0 Rr0 = r∗ ≈ 845.872 999.981
The asymptotics for JP(SA) yields a value of 717, which aligns well with the observed 722. For the
CUSUM procedure we obtain that the approximation for JP(CA) gives 541 vs. 563. For ADD∞(CA) we
have 314 vs. 463. For JP(SQA ), JP(SrA) and ADD∞(SrA) (which are asymptotically all the same) we have
500 vs. 502. We see that the accuracy is reasonable.
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Figure 2. Average detection delay ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν] for the four detection procedures for
µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 1, and γ = 103.
Figure 2 shows the plots of ADDν(T ) = Eν [T −ν|T > ν] vs. the changepoint ν for all four procedures
of interest. At ν = 0 the CUSUM procedure requires 563 observations (on average) to detect this change,
while the SR procedure 722 observations. Overall, we see that the CUSUM procedure is superior to the
SR procedure for 0 6 ν 6 270; the two procedures are at performance parity at ν = 270. Again, we can
conclude that the CUSUM procedure is better than the SR rule for changes that occur either immediately,
or in the near to mid-term future. However, for ν > 1000, the SR procedure considerably outperforms the
CUSUM procedure: the former’s ADD is 263, while the letter’s is 463. Hence, the SR procedure is better for
detecting distant changes than the CUSUM procedure, as expected. The (flat) ADD for the SRP procedure
is approximately 503. This is twice as worse as the SR procedure for ν > 1500, whose detection lag for
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such large ν’s is 263, and stays steady for larger ν’s.
Regarding the performance of the SR–r procedure compared to that of the other three procedures, one
immediate observation is that SR–r is uniformly better than the SRP rule; although the difference is only
8 ÷ 9 samples, i.e., a mere fraction of a percent compared to the magnitude of the ADD itself. A similar
conclusion was previously reached by Moustakides et al. (2011) for the Gaussian-to-Gaussian model and
for the exponential-to-exponential model. Overall, out of the four procedures in question, the best in the
minimax sense is the SR–r procedure. However, it is only slightly better that the SRP procedure since both
are nearly asymptotical optimal in the minimax sense.
Yet another observation one may make from Figure 2 is that the magnitude of the difference between
ADD0(T ) and ADD2000(T ) for the SR procedure is extremely large, and the fact that the convergence to
the steady state ADD is very slow. This can be explained by the fact that for this case the SR detection
statistic is “singular”: Rn as a function of n is a diagonal line with unit slope since Rn deviates very little
from its mean value n for such small changes.
The obtained ADDν(T ) for each procedure for selected values of ν are summarized in Table 4. The
table also reports the lower bound (3.5) and the STADDJST(T ). We remind that the SR procedure is strictly
optimal in the sense of minimizing the STADD. From the table we see that its STADD is 396.44 average
observations. Since the SRP rule, SQA , is an equalizer, JP(SQA ) = JST(SQA ); for this particular case, we see
that the SRP rule is as efficient as 502.64 average observations in terms of its STADD. The other two rivals –
the CUSUM procedure and the SR–r procedure – are almost equally efficient: 471.67 average observations
for the former, and 477.43 average observations for the latter. All in all, the SRP rule is the worst in the
multi-cyclic sense.
Table 4. Summary of the performance of the four procedures for µ = 1000, θ = 1001, a = 1, and γ = 103.
ADDν(T ) = Eν [T − ν|T > ν]
Procedure 0 100 250 500 1000 1500 2000 JST(T )
CUSUM
563.26
(SADD) 495.06 467.31 463.29 463.15 463.15 463.15 471.67
SR
722.36
(SADD) 626.20 498.64 339.18 268.14 263.27 262.91 396.44
SRP 502.636 (SADD)
SR–r
495.10
(SADD) 454.29 454.39 473.65 489.82 493.22 493.89 477.56
Lower Bound 485.60
6. AN APPLICATION TO CYBERSECURITY
In this section, we apply change-point detection theory in cybersecurity – for rapid anomaly detection in
computer networks’ traffic. A volume-type traffic anomaly is an event identified with a change in traffic’s
volume characteristics, e.g., in the traffic’s intensity defined as the packet rate (i.e., number of network pack-
ets transmitted through the link per time unit). For example, a change in the packet rate may be caused by an
intrusion attempt, a power outage, or a misconfiguration in the network equipment; whether unintentionally
or not, such events occur daily and are of harm to the victim. One way to mitigate the harm is by devising an
automated anomaly detection system to rapidly catch suspicious, spontaneous changes in the traffic flow, so
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an appropriate response can be provided in a timely manner. To this end, such an anomaly detection system
can be designed, e.g., by using change-point detection.
This is not a new idea; see, e.g., Blazˇek et al. (2001); Tartakovsky et al. (2006a,b). It is typically a
modification of either the CUSUM procedure or Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). The SR
procedure has never been paid much attention in this application. However, recall that it is exactly optimal in
the multi-cyclic sense for detecting changes that occur in a distant future. We believe that this formulation is
appropriate for the problem of anomaly detection in computer networks, and hence, the SR procedure may
be a better option than CUSUM. We will show that this is indeed the case.
First, we note that in order to employ a detection procedure it is desirable to know the pre- and post-
change models. As we focus on volume-type anomalies, the observations in our case are instantaneous
values of the packet rate (traffic intensity). It is currently believed that the behavior of the packet rate can be
well modeled by a Poisson process. The main reason is the tremendous growth of the Internet backbone in
recent years. See, e.g., Cao et al. (2002), Karagiannis et al. (2004), and Vishwanathy et al. (2009). Using real
data, we will show that the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model (which is the standard continuous approximation
to the discrete Poisson process when a = 1) is appropriate to characterize the traffic intensity. Moreover,
this model is more general than the Poisson model since by controlling parameter a one can change the
effect of a shift in the mean on the variance.
We now present the results of testing of SR and CUSUM for a real Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attack, namely, an Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) reflector attack. The essence of this kind of
attacks is to congest the victim’s link with echo reply (ping) requests sent by a large number of separate
compromised machines (reflectors) so as to have the victim’s machine exhaust all of its resources handling
the ping requests and ultimately crush. This kind of an attack clearly creates a volume-type of anomaly in
the victim’s traffic flow.
The ICMP data trace is courtesy of the Los Angeles Network Data Exchange and Repository (LAN-
DER) project (see http://www.isi.edu/ant/lander). This is a research-oriented traffic capture, storage and
analysis infrastructure that operates under Los Nettos, a regional Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the Los
Angeles area. The aggregate traffic volume through Los Nettos measures over 1 Gigabit/s each way, and the
ISP’s backbone is 10 Gigabit. Leveraged by a Global Positioning System (GPS) clock, LANDER’s capture
equipment is able to collect data at line speed and with a down-to-the-nanosecond time precision.
The attack starts at roughly 102 seconds into the trace and lasts for about 240 seconds. According to the
data provider, the number of reflectors is 143, which gives a general idea as to the attack’s intensity. The
exact intensity can be gathered from Figure 3, which depicts the corresponding traffic volume characteristics.
Specifically, Figure 3(a) shows the packet rate as a function of time. The sampling rate is 0.5 seconds. The
total number of samples in the trace is 879. It can be seen that the packet rate explodes at the attack’s starting
point (102 seconds into the trace), and goes back to the original (pre-attack) level at the attack’s ending point
(roughly 348 seconds into the trace). Figure 3(b) shows the bit rate as a function of time. The bit rate is
defined as the number of bits of information transmitted through the link per time unit. This is yet another
volume characteristic. Apart from the spike at approximately 148 seconds into the trace, its behavior is
relatively calm throughout the trace. This is consistent with the fact that this is an ICMP reflector attack,
i.e., a flooding-type of attack consisting of ping requests, which are small in size. That is, during the attack
the traffic flow is very packet-dense, but the aggregate amount of information carried by the packets stays
about the same as it was prior to the attack.
We estimated the packet rate’s average and variance for legitimate traffic and for attack traffic too; in
both cases, to estimate the average we used the usual sample mean, and to estimate the variance we used
the usual sample variance. For legitimate traffic we obtained that the average packet rate is about 13329.764
packets per second, and the variance is in the neighborhood of 266972.736 packets per second; the aggregate
number of samples is 401. For attack traffic the numbers are 17723.833 and 407968.14, respectively, while
the number of samples is 478. We can now see the effect of the attack: it leads to an increase in the packet
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(a) Packet rate.
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Figure 3. ICMP reflector attack: traffic volume characteristics.
rate’s average and variance by approximately 50% each. Also, note that both averages are rather high. This
justifies our large values for µ and θ chosen in the preceding section. This also justifies the point made in
the introduction that if the packet rate truly were Poisson, with such high average it would be practically
indistinguishable from Gaussian with σ2 = µ.
The fact that neither for legitimate traffic nor for attack traffic the variance is not the same as the mean
suggests to revise the conventional Poisson model. A Gaussian distribution may be a better alternative. To
see how well the data agree with this hypothesis, we now access the goodness of fit of a Gaussian distribution
and the data. Figure 4 shows the empirical densities of the packet rate for legitimate and attack traffic. A
high level of resemblance of both curves with the Gaussian distribution is apparent.
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(a) Legitimate (pre-attack) traffic.
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(b) Attack traffic.
Figure 4. ICMP reflector attack: packet rate pdf with a Gaussian fit.
The same conclusion can be made from an inspection of the corresponding Q-Q plots (quantile-quantile)
shown in Figure 5. Specifically, the Q-Q plot for legitimate traffic is shown in Figure 5(a), and one for attack
traffic in Figure 5(b). Both plots are for centered and scaled data, so the fitted Gaussian distribution is the
standard normal distribution. The fact that either plot is a straight line also confirms the “Gaussianness” of
the data distribution.
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(a) Legitimate (pre-attack) traffic.
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(b) Attack traffic.
Figure 5. ICMP reflector attack: Q-Q plots for packet rate distribution vs. Gaussian distribution.
In summary, we conclude that distributions of the packet rate are Gaussian for both legitimate and attack
traffic. For legitimate traffic the variance-to-mean ratio is about 20.028 and for attack traffic it is 23.018.
This is evidence that the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model with a = 20÷ 23 is appropriate to use for describing
the behavior of the traffic flow in the trace.
We now proceed to the performance analysis. Since the ICMP attack is extremely contrast, we expect
that any reasonable detection procedure will detect it in no time. As a result, it will be difficult to judge
whether SR is better than CUSUM or not. This can be overcome by “manually” lowering the intensity of
the attack, e.g., by applying the following transformation to values of the packet rate for attack’s traffic
X˜i =
√
13600 × 20.028 × Xi − 17723.833√
407968.14
+ 13600,
where Xi is the original value of the attack’s packet rate at the i-th sample. This makes the data in the trace
behave according to the N (µ, aµ)-to-N (θ, aθ) model with µ = 13329.764, θ = 13600 and a = 20.028.
The result is shown in Figure 6. We see that the attack is not as contrast any more.
The next step is to make sure that the ARL to false alarm for each procedure is at the same desired level
γ > 1. To accomplish this, we recall that asymptotically, for γ sufficiently large, ARL(CA) ≈ A/(Igζ2)−
logA/If − 1/(Igζ) and ARL(SA) ≈ A/ζ; in our case, Ig ≈ 0.1369, If ≈ 0.1342 and ζ ≈ 0.7313.
Thus, for, e.g., γ = 1000 (which is moderate from a practical point of view), the threshold for the CUSUM
procedure should be set to 76.32, and that for the SR procedure to 731.3. We confirmed both thresholds
numerically using the methodology of Section 4: the actual ARL to false alarm for the CUSUM procedure is
998.4, and that for the SR procedure is 1000.1. We can now employ both procedures to detect the diminished
version of the attack. The result is shown in Figure 7. Specifically, Figure 7(a) shows the behavior of the SR
detection statistic for the first 120 seconds of the trace’s data (recall that the attack starts 102 seconds into
the trace), and Figure 7(b) shows the same for the CUSUM detection statistic.
We see that both procedures successfully detect the attack, though at the expense of raising three false
alarms along the way. The detection delay for the SR procedure is roughly 15 seconds (or 30 samples), and
that for the CUSUM procedure is about 18 seconds (or 36 samples). Thus, the SR procedure is better. Yet
one may argue that the SR procedure is only slightly better. The difference is small simply because the trace
is too short: if the attack took place at a point farther into the trace, and we had enough “room” to repeat
the SR procedure at least a few times, the detection delay would be much smaller than that of the CUSUM
procedure. Since in real life legitimate traffic dominates, the multi-cyclic idea is a natural fit.
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Figure 6. ICMP reflector attack: packet rate with attack’s intensity diminished.
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Figure 7. ICMP (diminished) reflector attack: detection.
7. CONCLUSION
We considered the basic iid version of the change-point detection problem for the Gaussian model with
mean µ > 0 and variance σ2 connected via σ2 = aµ with a > 0, a known constant. Of the two degrees of
freedom – µ and a – the change is only in the mean (from one known value to another), though the variance
is affected as well. For this scenario, we accomplished two objectives.
First, we carried out a peer-to-peer multiple-measure comparative performance analysis of four detec-
tion procedures: CUSUM, SR, SRP and SR–r. We benchmarked the performance of the procedures via
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Pollak’s maximal average delay to detection and Shiryaev’s multi-cyclic stationary average delay to detec-
tion, subject to a tolerable lower bound, γ, on the ARL to false alarm. We tested the asymptotic (as γ →∞)
approximations for operating characteristics using numerical techniques (solving Fredholm-type integral
equations numerically). The overall conclusion is that in practically interesting cases the approximations’
accuracy is “reasonable” or better.
Second, we considered an application of change-point detection to cybersecurity, specifically to the
problem of rapid anomaly detection in computer networks’ traffic. Using real data we first showed that
network traffic’s statistical behavior can be well-described by the Gaussian model with σ2 = aµ; due to
the fact that the effect of a shift in the mean on the variance can be controlled through parameter a, the
Gaussian model is more flexible than the traditional Poisson one. We then successively employed the SR
and CUSUM procedures to detect an ICMP reflector attack. The SR procedure was quicker in detecting the
attack, which can be explained by its exact multi-cyclic optimality when detecting changes occurring in a
far time horizon. Based on this we recommend the SR procedure for the purposes of anomaly detection in
computer networks.
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